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Background: This study identifies a promising, new focus for the crisis management research in the health care
domain. After reviewing the literature on health care crisis management, there seems to be a knowledge-gap
regarding organisational change and adaption, especially when health care situations goes from normal, to non-
normal, to pathological and further into a state of emergency or crisis.
Discussion: Based on studies of escalating situations in obstetric care it is suggested that two theoretical
perspectives (contingency theory and the idea of failure as a result of incomplete interaction) tend to simplify the
issue of escalation rather than attend to its complexities (including the various power relations among the
stakeholders involved). However studying the process of escalation as inherently complex and social allows us to
see the definition of a situation as normal or non-normal as an exercise of power in itself, rather than representing
a putatively correct response to a particular emergency.
Implications: The concept of escalation, when treated this way, can help us further the analysis of clinical and
institutional acts and competence. It can also turn our attention to some important elements in a class of social
phenomenon, crises and emergencies, that so far have not received the attention they deserve. Focusing on
organisational choreography, that interplay of potential factors such as power, professional identity, organisational
accountability, and experience, is not only a promising focus for future naturalistic research but also for developing
more pragmatic strategies that can enhance organisational coordination and response in complex events.Background
This study will outline what has been identified as a
promising focus of future research into health care crisis.
Reviewing the research of health care crisis manage-
ment, there seems to be a knowledge-gap concerning
the process of organisational change and adaption, espe-
cially as a situation goes from normal, to non-normal
and then further into a state of crisis. Following the
identification of a knowledge-gap an outline of a re-
search agenda will be presented, intended to support the
study of the process of escalation in health care.Crisis
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orisettings. Defined by Runciman [1] a crisis is “the point
in the course of a disease at which a decisive change
occurs leading either to recovery or to death” (p. 156).
The definition treats the notion of crisis in binary terms
as a clear transition from a non-crisis state to a state of
crisis. In the same way crisis management is defined as
the efforts to recover from this loss of control [2]. In
other words, crisis management is seen as the process of
returning to the previous binary state or status. This
process of recovery from a loss of control is typically
dealt with by means of crisis management training.
Team training concepts, with their origin in industries
such as aviation [3], have been introduced into health-
care with the aim of enhancing non-technical skills such
as leadership [4], situation awareness [5], communica-
tion, and decision making [6,7]. Team training typically
is performed in simulated environments [8,9] and
researchers have put much effort into the development
of these environments and methods to assess the effects
of such training. However these assessment cycles tendtral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
ginal work is properly cited.
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of crisis management skills like improved teamwork pro-
cesses by ensuring certain “correct behaviours” of indivi-
duals [10]. There is also a debate whether enhancing
these non-technical skills have the payoff those who ad-
vocate instruction and remediation of these kinds believe
they actually have [11-14].
Previous research into health care crises acknowledge
that the process(es) at the centre of any crisis (like the
conditions and symptoms of the human whose life is in
danger) can be complex, reflecting any number of some-
times even opposing goals as well as high uncertainty.
Still the literature tends to treat organisation boundaries
and the organisation itself as stable entities. However in
any modern hospital different sub-organisations like the
labour ward, the operation ward and the paediatrics
ward are typically loosely coupled (with a high degree of
self-governance and local adaption) to each other. In cri-
sis situations however they can become tightly coupled
and highly interdependent (e.g. when performing a Cae-
sarean section). This can lead to new, emerging and in-
herently complex properties of the system as a whole –
ones that can be temporary or permanent or both [15].a
But when does this tight coupling occur? What charac-
terises this coupling? Which actors become tightly
coupled and why?
The questions asked offer a promising way forward for
studying medical crises. Typical solutions to the problem
of managing crises have taken the form of proposals to
improve behaviour (as described above) and implemen-
tation of more rigid workplace routines and structures.
However from a complexity perspective, such strategies
seem to be problematic. Rather than focusing on indi-
vidual behaviour, the complexity perspective turns in-
stead to the notion of bounded (or local) rationality [16].
Because certain behaviour can seem irrational or even
erroneous from one perspective (particularly in the after-
math of an incident) does not necessarily mean that it
was irrational or erroneous at the time of the incident
[17], making notions such as “violations” highly prob-
lematic [18]. When it comes to the implementation of
protocols, rules and routines as solutions to issues of
health care safety, the complexity perspective counsels
caution and suggests there may be serious limits to epis-
temology that underlies them and consequently the
kinds of solutions that so far emerged [19-22].
While these issues have not been extensively studied by
medical researchers, scholars interested in naturalistic set-
tings of joint cognitive systems have given them some at-
tention [23]. Some examples of studies of health care
complexity includes studies of safety under dynamic and
changing conditions [24], the way in which technology, in
emergencies, tightens interconnection across departments
and specialities [25], how the implementation of newtechnology can affect the working environment [26], chal-
lenges differential understandings and representations of
health information pose for end-users and patient safety
[27-29], and the strategies used by healthcare staff to
achieve resilience and avoid conflicts under high-pressure
conditions [30,31]. Researchers of joint cognitive systems
have began to develop theories that incorporate a com-
plexity perspective into the understanding of medical fail-
ure and success [23]. Such ideas present an opportunity
for the exploration and development of the notion of cri-
sis—empirically as well as theoretically building further on
these ideas, a new focus of analysis for health care crisis
can emerge from looking at the notion of escalation.
Escalation
The process of escalation has previously been defined as
a situation “where an initial irregularity develops into a
continually deteriorating situation and starts affecting
other areas in an accelerating tempo, with consequences
that are difficult to overview and impossible to predict”
[32] (p. 220). Woods and Patterson [33] outline that “the
concept of escalation concerns a process – how situa-
tions move from canonical or textbook to non-routine
to exceptional”. This position acknowledges the need for
studying the dynamic process preceding the definition of
a state of crisis.
Furthermore Woods characterises escalating situations
in the following ways:
 A cascade of effects occurs in the monitored
process.
 Demands for cognitive activity increase as the
problem cascades.
 Demands for coordination increase as the problem
cascades.
 The cascade and escalation represent a dynamic
process.
These are important characteristics that should en-
courage further analysis. The first point is that by linking
cascade of effects to a monitored process risks uncoup-
ling this process from its social context. The next two
points follow from the first. It assumes that cognitive ac-
tivity and socio-cultural coordination increase as a result
of the cascading problem rather than treat both cogni-
tive activity and these coordination efforts as an inherent
part of the escalating process. This in turn can further
divorce the escalation process from its social context
and this can lead to arbitrary analytic divisions say be-
tween inside and outside the organisation.
Using examples from maternity wards, our focus so far
has been on the escalating labour situations starting of
as normal, but at some point changing to be defined
otherwise followed by the involvement of more staff
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situations can deteriorate and at some point a decision
to perform an emergency Caesarean section might be
taken. This is followed by the treatment of not one but
two patients (the child and the mother). In previous
work we have, based on naturalistic studies, suggested
that seemingly simple intervention decisions (such as
when a midwife calls a physician for help) can be inter-
preted to be complex to the point that the model of
strict adherence to best practice guidelines needs to be
complemented with one of enhancing organisational di-
versity [19]. In this debate article, we will argue that not
only standard practices for how to manage escalating
situations needs to be critically reflected upon, but also
current best practice ways of understanding crisis and
emergencies in healthcare need to be rethought. Instead
of viewing escalation as a process uncoupled from its so-
cial context, the present analysis suggests that it is ne-
cessary to outline a theory for escalation as a social
process in which coordination and cognitive activity are
highly interrelated. In this sense our model of escalation
is not simply one of organisational escalation or clinical
escalation, in fact we questions whether any analytical
choice to separate the two can be fruitful. Rather we see
both as highly interrelated and consequently an analysis
of escalation cannot separate the two.
Discussion
Consistent with the principle of epistemological plur-
alism [34] this discussion will explore, using multiple
theoretical perspectives, the problem of obstetrical
interventions. Here these will be treated as partially
overlapping and sometimes contradictory accounts
generated around critical decision points. The intent
here is to help develop a vocabulary and a scientific
agenda that can help us better understand the social
process of escalation and the role these event(s) plays
in health care crisis.
The contingency theory perspective
Organisational contingency theory, which attempts to
describe the best way to organise human work given
a particular set of environmental conditions, assumes
that quickly changing local conditions can best be
handled by decentralised organisations. Having central
decision makers involved in all organisational actions
and responses can create unacceptable delays and in-
formation bottlenecks [35]. Rather, advocators of the
theory emphasise that the more dynamic the environ-
ment, the more organic and immediate the organisa-
tional structure may become. Contingency theory
typically invokes the example of military organisa-
tions, which are extremely hierarchical in peacetime
with a heavy emphasis on planning, standardisationand top down protocol like drills and ceremony, with
the discipline and power necessary to enforce all
these aspects of life. On the battlefield however, these
structures not only become less rigid and more flex-
ible in response to fluid and haphazard situations but
also flatten, with fewer explicit appeals made to rank.
There can even be rank inversions where lower-
ranking personnel may be better positioned (and
equipped with more local knowledge) to take appro-
priate action than higher-ranking officers [36].
These findings have been replicated in a number of
studies of high-reliability organisations [37-39]. This
suggests that the decentralisation of decision-making au-
thority, especially in regard to safety issues, can permit
rapid and appropriate responses to dangers by the
people closest to the problems at hand [40]. Wildavksy
called this “decentralised anticipation,” and argues that
micro-level entrepreneurial efforts can do more to im-
prove safety than any centralised and restrictive top-
down policies or structures [41]. High reliability theory
also stresses the need for operational discretion at lower
levels in the organisation. Even the lowest ranks on the
deck of an aircraft carrier have the authority to suspend
any take off or landing that might pose unnecessary risk
[42]. As a result, high reliability has looked carefully at
roles validation of minority opinion [38] and encourage-
ment of dissent [43] can play in averting crisis, some-
thing echoed in the recommendation to treat nurses as a
primary investment in patient safety [44].
When it comes to obstetric interventions, however,
contingency theory does not seem to hold water. Rather
than become a flatter, more organic organisation, obste-
trics (and healthcare in general) seems to do something
quite different in crisis and emergencies. This is to make
more use, not less, of expertise embedded in hierarchy
and structure [45,46]. For example, one of the most im-
portant intervention decisions for hospital midwives is
whether to call a resident (physician) for assistance.b If
this decision is made, the organisation seems to have
added another layer in response to the escalating prob-
lem. Organisational changes occurring during health
care escalations can be characterised as upward and out-
ward “reach” to different levels and types of institutiona-
lised hierarchy/competences. This seems to pick up
tempo and pace if the situation deteriorates. During a
crisis not only the charge of the patient is handed over
to the physician, but also the control of the ward and
the work carried out there at least in the “intermediate
model” of labour care we studied. Midwifes essentially
“step back” from the responsibility of the judgment char-
acteristic of all aspects of normality [47]. Intervention
decisions, in the terms of actively delivering the baby,
and thus handling the crisis, then formally belong to the
physician with the midwifes no longer seeing themselves
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the term, for whatever happens next [19].
This, from the point of view of contingency theory,
seems counter intuitive. To understand situations like
this we require new models and perspectives. In particu-
lar, what we do not understand very well is why hier-
archy and structure (often invoked as lay and even
“scientific” reasons for failure in crises and emergencies)
sometimes function as very effective resources in health-
care crises. The literature studying healthcare profes-
sionals has largely focused on the relationship between
novices and experts [48]. Some literature is also available
on the models of competence and hierarchy that inform
the health care system [49]. However, how expertise and
authority “shift” during crisis is not something that the
literature so far has not focused on.
The explanatory model of incomplete interaction
The addition of further layers of organisation in escalat-
ing emergencies generates what the healthcare literature
typically characterises as “communication problems”. The
result is problems arising in emergencies and escalations
are often treated as (or reduced to) a failure of communi-
cation [50,51]. To what extent this is an appropriation of a
common sense discourse, one that equates communica-
tion disorders with institutional escalations or crises, it is
too early to say. But note that what is at work here is a
common fallacy derived from folk sociology: Namely if the
individual or individuals act “correctly” the same will be
true for the social institutions they work within.
This kind of thinking Durkheim years ago tried to cor-
rect still seems to underlie much of the literature on
healthcare emergencies. Communication problems are
typically the targets for safety intervention in healthcare
[7-9,52] and it is difficult to know, given the present
state of research, how positively these interventions have
impacted. However to reduce problems of organisational
choreography in an escalating crisis to simply a commu-
nication problem tends to “flatten out” perhaps prema-
turely the explanation curve. Other factors that might be
at work here include institutionally mediated historical
and temporal dimension (tempo) of these incidents.
When factors like these are not acknowledged, there is a
risk that other significant issues such as power and hier-
archy are muted [53]. Unfortunately, in safety and or-
ganisational studies, the analysis and “solutions” that are
often proposed to handle clinical error tend to finesse
issues of this kind. What actually occurs is that these
aspects (and the kinds of negotiated practices we have
been discussing here) essentially “fall out” of most ana-
lyses of health care safety.
To explain escalation in terms of incomplete interac-
tions between actors creates several analytic problems
and resolutions. The first is the reduction of complexevent chains and choreographiesc – ones that are seldom
successfully handled by any linear model – to some kind
of social atomism (or psychologism) in which a single
actor is thought be to (and is often held) accountable for
that particular crisis [54,55]. As well, the literature on
healthcare and safety tends to valorise individual per-
formance so both a “hero” is praised for his/her success,
and/or individual actors are singled out for blame
[56,57]. In fact, in most explanations of crises situation,
there is a tendency not to “go above” the shop floor.
This too reinforces the tendency in the literature, to pro-
vide to accounts of individual competence and failure.
This of course says much about the value Westerners
place on the individual and on the individual compe-
tence and autonomy. However this can mask the im-
portance event chains and clinical chorography can have
for healthcare institutions and clinical effectiveness.
Escalation as a social process
Treating escalation as a process decoupled from the or-
ganisation, and one that can be managed by the best
practice routines (such as calling for assistance at the
point where the situation is no longer being normal),
holds the risk of underestimating “the social construc-
tion of the context that both legitimates a particular
form of action and constitutes the world in the progress
. . . [so] we might begin to consider not what is the situ-
ation, but how it is situated” [58] (p. 1471). A simple ex-
ample of how the process of situating constructs the
obstetric situation could make use of the concept of ac-
tive management of labour [59]. Here, midwifes are
instructed not to accept patients to the delivery unit un-
less they are in active labour. The reasons for this are
related to the conviction that labour is not a process that
benefits from hospitalisation before labour has entered
its “active phase”. Accepting patients “too” early in the
natural process of labour can well medicalise problems a
delivery unit cannot handle typically well. This can lead
to a situation where a normal birth is defined as a non-
normal labour (a definition that influences the social
construction of escalating obstetrical situations) and the
response is to medically induce labour. This can intro-
duce considerable risk compared to the natural onset of
labour. This construction and definition of context can
also be a means to negotiate power (adding or not add-
ing another layer of the hierarchy) and, every time it is
applied, it also reinforces the medical hierarchy model.
In the healthcare literature, the shift of responsibility
as a situation deteriorates could be written off as just a
shift of responsibility required due to an increasingly
more complex situation, to an actor with more know-
ledge (as the hierarchy-competence model does). How-
ever, when looked at closely, this explanation seems too
facile. In fact almost all midwifes are well aware that
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and competence than themselves to handle crises or
emergencies because in most deliveries one turns first a
junior physician [19].
What these calls for an obstetrician do is in effect to
mark an organisational transition, i.e., a shift from a nor-
mal situation to a crisis. In Foucault’s terms, these calls
enable midwives to renegotiate “the order of things”
[60,61], and this occurs through their redefinition (their
release of control and authority) in a specific institu-
tional “activity”. Midwifes can wield considerable power
in the delivery room because they can construct and de-
fine situations there as normal or not. For a midwife vir-
tually any kind of ward event can become evidence for
one definition or another regarding the ward’s and
patients’ status. Any number and variety of factors like
the emergency staff on duty, number of patients at the
ward, the length of pregnancy, or time of the day can be
cited by midwives as evidence that a situation is normal
or not.
When viewed this way, an organisation’s shift from
normal state to crisis cannot simply be seen as a re-
sponse to a deteriorating process. The example of the
midwives here shows the need to see escalation as a so-
cial process – one constructed by those who can alter or
improvise on on-going habitual practice sometimes even
to the extent that it can throw normal practice into
question. There is seemingly a paradox at work here. In
healthcare crises, hierarchy, i.e., power can be invoked to
redefine the situation so that alternatives to local prac-
tice emerge. At the same time, the redefinition of local
practice can also confirm the logic and rationality of
normal practice and hierarchy. It is this simultaneous,
challenging, extending and re-legitimatising of trad-
itional practice and hierarchy that occurs in almost any
crisis. This helps explain why these events can be so re-
fractory to most forms of social analysis. In other words,
the structural and social processes at work in any escal-
ation can be difficult to capture or analyse, especially
given the standard models of health care work and
health care organisations. Further, the construction of
the contingencies (emphasised by the actors themselves)
can mask the role that power and hierarchy play in the
process. However, when we shift focus and view escal-
ation as an inherently social process, the construction of
events there can be seen, among other things, as an ex-
ercise of power - one that occurs in and as response to a
complex social world.
Again, the kinds of organisational changes that can
occur during an escalating situation in delivery units do
not follow the patterns predicted by classical contingency
theory. In health care for example, the response seems to
be to further rely on (and build) hierarchical structures.
However, analysing event chains, and the way thesemidwives first problematise and then legitimatise the
handover of responsibility in a crisis can lead us closer to
understanding how healthcare emergencies and crises get
defined as such. In fact, it may be useful to trace out how
hierarchical structures and local practice and resources
mutually become redefined and extended during escal-
ation process that precedes any crisis. This could have po-
tentially more yield than for example continuing to focus
on the role communication plays in crisis situations.
Implications
Taking account of the social processes of escalation
offers a new promising focus for healthcare research –
one that has epistemological as well as practical/prag-
matic implications. It is suggested that organisational
choreography, involving an interplay of potential factors
such as power, professional identity, organisational ac-
countability, and experience, become a new focus for
naturalistic action research [62]. Rather than seeking an
objective “place to stand”, such studies of escalation
emerge from and reflect the results of long term, on-
going collaborations between practitioners and research-
ers. Consistent with action research’s best practice, what
is identified as both “problem” and “solution” can be
reformulated iteratively over the lifetime of the project.
So far we have mainly studied the surface of what con-
stitutes local practice in escalating situations. The next
crucial question to answer is why the interpreted local
practice is seen as a logical part of institutional practice.
Questions to ask here include: Why is it perfectly logical
for a senior midwife to call a much more junior phys-
ician to take over the responsibility of a non-normal
situation? How does a crisis “deform” traditional, habit-
ual, even historically determined local clinical practice,
especially the ones practiced across and between clinical
specialities? Clinical practice of course is local, as are all
responses to emergency situations. But how does local
practice change when crises occurs and escalates? It is
this escalation, this shift in tempo, that sets off a crisis
from normal events and this qualitative change is central
for us to understand if we are to build an “anatomy of
escalation” in much the same way as Plumb et al. argued
for an “anatomy of patient safety” in a previous issue of
this journal [63].
The more pragmatic implication of the research con-
cerns the ways in which healthcare practitioners are now
prepared for the complexities of escalating situations. Ra-
ther than preparing for crisis management by fostering
“more appropriate” behaviour of individuals, the focus on
escalation turns towards problems of interaction, coordin-
ation and enhancing organisational diversity [64]. In times
when “production efficiency” is the most celebrated aim of
the healthcare system (at least in the Scandinavian country
that we have studied) just providing the possibility for
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ward nurses, anaesthesiologists, paediatric nurses and pae-
diatricians to meet and problematise issues concerning
their interactions in the times that they become tightly
coupled and highly interdependent, could be seen as a suc-
cess. We hope to bring readers of this journal reports soon
about the outcomes of such processes.
If we better understand not only how local practices are
exploited in crisis but also how local practice can deform
under stress, this could lead to innovation in both know-
ledge and practice. Using terms like escalation, event chains
and choreography could help us strengthened the analysis
of clinical acts and competence. This can help us turn our
attention, as all good models should, to important elements
in an important class of social phenomenon, crises and
emergencies, that we so far have overlooked.End notes
a The notion of coupling is here used much in the
same way as in Snook’s analysis of a Friendly-fire acci-
dent over northern Iraq in 1994 [15]. Analysing how di-
verse actors adapted locally under years of self-
governance what was locally rational behaviour in “nor-
mal” circumstances made the system fail in the “non-
normal” situation when the actors became tightly
coupled. The locally rational behaviour of all actors
involved, according to Snook, made two US F15 pilots
shoot down the own Army’s helicopters once the actors
became tightly coupled and highly interdependent.
b In the Scandinavian country that we studied, mid-
wives are specialist nurses with a significant medical au-
thority. Unless the situation deviates from what is
considered “normal” pregnancies as well as labours are
facilitated by specialist nurses (midwives) without in-
volvement of physicians.
c An event chain has much in common with genealogy
“tree” but rather than trace family or inheritance, it
enables us to track the “hand off” of resources, know-
ledge, and practice, within and between, that occur be-
tween different healthcare domains routinely and in
emergencies. The term choreography refers to issues of
tempo, pace and timing as well as the differential reli-
ance, informed both historically and by the moment, to
healthcare/clinical resources.Competing interests
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